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Provision	of	psychological	services	under	Medicare:	Broken	but	not	beyond	
repair.	
	
Robert	King,	School	of	Psychology	and	Counselling,	Queensland	University	of	
Technology.	
	
The	Better	Access	to	Psychiatrists,	Psychologists	and	General	Practitioners	
through	the	Medicare	Benefits	Schedule	Initiative	(Better	Access)	was	designed	
to	enhance	access	to	mental	health	services	and	thereby	improve	the	mental	
health	of	Australians.		This	paper	focuses	on	that	part	of	the	initiative	concerned	
with	providing	a	rebate	for	psychological	services	and	for	the	sake	of	brevity	the	
term	Better	Access	will	be	used	to	refer	to	this	specific	component,	even	though	
there	are	other	elements	of	the	initiative.		Better	Access	provides	funding	for	
general	psychological	services	and	services	provided	by	clinical	psychologists.		
The	central	argument	of	this	paper	is	concerned	with	the	general	psychological	
services	component,	which	constitutes	the	large	preponderance	of	psychological	
services	funded	under	Better	Access.	
	
A	distinctive	feature	of	the	psychological	services	(other	than	those	provided	by	
clinical	psychologists)	funded	under	Better	Access	is	that	they	must	be	Focused	
Psychological	Strategies	(FPSs).		Five	such	strategies	are	specified.		All	but	one	
are	components	of	Cognitive	Behaviour	Therapy	(CBT).		The	other	is	
Interpersonal	Therapy	(IPT),	which	is	indicated	as	being	appropriate	for	
treatment	of	depression.		The	other	key	feature	is	that	the	number	of	funded	
sessions	is	limited	(up	to	10	in	a	calendar	year).		Most	providers	are	
psychologists	but	some	social	workers	and	occupational	therapists	can	provide	
FPSs	under	Better	Access.	
	
By	some	indicators,	Better	Access	has	been	a	great	success	(Pirkis,	Harris,	Hall	&	
Ftanou,	2011).		From	the	perspective	of	the	public,	it	has	indeed	increased	access	
to	psychological	services	by	supporting	a	network	of	affordable	providers.		
Where	once,	those	without	substantial	means	depended	on	services	such	as	
Lifeline	and	Centacare,	today	most	communities	will	have	a	private	psychology	
clinic	where	psychological	services	can	be	obtained	with	most	of	the	cost	
subsidized	by	the	Medicare	rebate.		From	the	perspective	of	the	profession,	
Better	Access	has	underwritten	a	vibrant,	viable	private	practice	alternative	to	
employment	in	public	health	or	community	services.		It	has	also	opened	up	many	
new	positions	because	for	the	most	part	the	health	and	community	services	have	
persisted	or	expanded.		From	a	public	policy	perspective,	the	public	health	goal	
of	reducing	the	burden	of	illness	of	high	prevalence	disorders	such	as	anxiety	
and	depression	by	increasing	the	rate	of	treatment	of	these	disorders	also	
appears	to	have	been	met	because	many	more	people	are	receiving	treatment.	
	
So,	is	there	problem?		As	I	see	it,	there	are	important	weaknesses	in	the	system	
that	adversely	impact	on	clients,	providers	and	public	policy	objectives.		The	
system	needs	to	be	fixed	if	we	are	to	achieve	our	aim	of	providing	affordable,	
effective	psychological	services	to	the	Australian	public.		Let’s	look	at	these	
weaknesses	as	they	affect	each	of	these	interests,	before	considering	what	needs	
to	be	done	to	remedy	the	problem.	
	
From	the	perspective	of	the	client.	
	
The	approach	taken	by	the	Better	Access	scheme	has	two	major	weaknesses	
when	considered	from	the	perspective	of	the	client.		Both	derive	from	wrong‐
headed	treatment	of	psychological	services	as	if	they	were	analogous	to	a	drug	or	
medical	procedure.		At	the	core	of	the	problem	is	the	restriction	of	rebates	to	a	
delimited	set	of	specified	interventions	–	the	FPSs.		This	has	two	serious	
consequences.		The	first	is	that	the	critical	role	of	the	client	as	an	active	agent	in	
therapeutic	change	is	compromised.		The	second	is	that	there	is	no	effective	
quality	assurance	mechanism.			
	
The	specification	of	treatment	fails	to	take	into	the	centrality	of	the	client	as	an	
agent	in	the	treatment	process.		Rather	it	treats	the	client	as	a	passive	recipient	
of	a	an	intervention	prescribed	by	an	expert	therapist.			This	is	not	to	dispute	that	
therapies	such	as	CBT	involve	and	even	require	active	client	engagement	and	
collaboration.		It	is	rather	that,	even	before	treatment	commences,	the	position	of	
the	client	is	determined	by	the	policy	and	funding	framework	of	the	Better	
Access	scheme.		The	client	is	in	effect	told	‘	this	is	the	therapy	you	need,	please	
collaborate’.			This	is	not	only	ethically	problematic,	it	is	inconsistent	with	
national	mental	health	policy	(Australian	Health	Ministers,	2008)	that	seeks	to	
empower	the	client	and	provide	the	client	with	every	opportunity	to	be	an	active	
partner	in	treatment.		Moreover,	it	is	antagonistic	to	everything	we	know	about	
what	makes	psychotherapy	effective	and	is	contrary	to	one	of	the	core	principles	
of	evidence‐based	practice.	
	
In	this	context	it	is	worth	referring	to	the	American	Psychological	Association	
(APA)	statement	on	evidence‐based	practice,	which	is	explicit	in	indicating	that	
choice	of	treatment	should	be	made	in	the	‘context	of	patient	characteristics,	
culture,	and	preferences’	(American	Psychological	Association,	2005).		The	APA	
statement	goes	on	to	say:	‘Psychological	services	are	most	effective	when	
responsive	to	the	patient’s	specific	problems,	strengths,	personality,	
sociocultural	context,	and	preferences.	Many	patient	characteristics,	such	as	
functional	status,	readiness	to	change,	and	level	of	social	support	are	known	to	
be	related	to	therapeutic	outcomes’.			
	
The	specification	of	a	limited	range	of	interventions	unreasonably	and	
unnecessarily	restricts	response	to	client	characteristics,	culture	and	
preferences.		It	is	a	one	size	fits	all	approach	that	treats	psychological	
interventions	as	if	they	are	analogous	to	a	drug	and	that	their	effects	were	
unmediated	by	person	who	is	asked	to	work	with	them.		The	reality	is	that	
psychotherapy	is	necessarily	a	negotiated	activity	and	is	likely	to	be	most	
satisfactory	and	effective	when	the	negotiations	are	not	excessively	constrained	
by	third	party	specification	of	treatment.	
	
Quality	assurance	is	at	the	core	of	client	interests	because	in	a	complex	area	such	
as	psychological	services,	it	is	difficult	for	clients	to	make	effective	judgments	
about	the	quality	of	services	they	are	receiving.		As	a	starting	point,	we	need	to	
make	a	brief	digression	into	the	world	of	commerce.		The	reason	for	this	is	that	
the	problem	of	consumer	judgment	about	quality	is	not	restricted	to	psychology.		
People	often	lack	information	to	judge	the	quality	of	goods	and	services	they	
purchase.		This	is	why	‘brand‐recognition’,	‘brand‐trust’	and	‘brand‐loyalty’	are	
such	key	concepts	in	the	world	of	commerce	and	marketing.		The	world	of	
advertising	is	substantially	devoted	to	brand	promotion	and	the	activation	of	
purchasing	behavior	as	a	result.		In	the	commercial	world,	brand	does	operate	as	
something	of	a	quality	guarantee	because	market	mechanisms	mean	that	brands	
that	fail	to	deliver	on	quality	are	ultimately	replaced	by	those	which	do,	despite	
the	best	efforts	of	advertisers	of	the	declining	brand.			
	
With	respect	to	the	psychological	services	funded	through	Medicare,	the	
specification	of	treatment	is	in	effect	an	attempt	to	achieve	quality	assurance	
through	branding.		Behind	all	the	science	and	evidence‐based	practice	is	a	simple	
proposition.		This	is	that	CBT	(or	any	other	specified	treatment)	is	a	reliable	
product	that	you	can	trust.		The	government	will	therefore	underwrite	these	
trusted	services	but	not	other	brands.		The	‘science’	provides	cover	for	this	
proposition.		The	government	is	assured	by	the	academic	and	professional	
community	that	the	evidence	shows	that	brand‐trust	is	warranted	and	that	these	
are	indeed	quality	services.		There	is	no	market	mechanism	to	sort	this	out	–	no	
competition	is	allowed.		It	is	a	North	Korean	approach	to	service	provision.			
	
This	top‐down,	paternalistic	approach	to	service	provision	might	be	justified	if	
there	was	in	fact	clear	evidence	that	some	‘brands’	of	psychological	intervention	
were	more	effective	than	others.		After	all,	the	state	does	have	a	duty	to	protect	
citizens	from	ineffective	or	dangerous	services	–	especially	when	the	state	itself	
funds	these	services.		However	not	only	is	there	an	absence	of	evidence	for	
superiority	of	CBT	or	any	other	brand,	there	is	overwhelming	evidence	for	brand	
equivalence.			Furthermore,	this	is	not	recent	knowledge.		In	1998,	I	pointed	to	
the	important	finding	that	CBT	and	IPT	had	been	found	to	be	equally	effective	in	
treatment	of	depression	(King,	1998).		I	suggested	then,	that	the	most	
parsimonious	explanation	was	that	intervention	characteristics	played	a	minor	
role	in	treatment	outcome.		However,	the	response	of	Medicare	to	this	evidence	
was	simply	to	include	IPT	in	the	list	of	branded	therapies	funded	under	Better	
Access.			
	
Since	then	a	succession	of	studies	and	meta‐analyses	have	consistently	shown	
little	if	any	difference	in	effect	between	purposeful	psychological	interventions,	
no	matter	what	the	brand	(Wampold	et	al.,	2002;	Cape	et	al,	2010;	Wampold	et	
al,	2011;	Cuijpers	et	al,	2012).		While	there	is	a	respectable	evidence‐base	to	
indicate	the	specified	interventions	are	superior	to	no	treatment	in	clinical	trials	
with	specified	populations,	it	is	the	fact	of	intervention	rather	than	the	form	of	
intervention	that	is	critical.	The	evidence	for	treatment	equivalence	is	now	so	
overwhelming	that	even	groups	with	vested	interest	in	branded	therapy	have	
begun	to	acknowledge	the	futility	of	an	approach	to	service	delivery	that	relies	
on	brands.		The	American	Psychological	Association	formally	declared	last	year	
that  “variations in outcome are more heavily influenced by patient characteristics 
e.g., chronicity, complexity, social support, and intensity—and by clinician and 
context factors than by particular diagnoses or specific treatment ‘brands’” (American 
Psychological Association, 2012) 
 
What this means is that Better Access relies for quality assurance on branding that has 
no validity.  Clients are not only reduced to unnecessary passivity as recipients or 
prescribed interventions.  They are also mislead that by the implication that these 
prescribed interventions are of superior quality and effectiveness to alternatives that 
might suit them better.	
	
From	the	perspective	of	the	practitioner	
The	requirement	that	the	practitioner	employ	a	specific	intervention	in	order	
that	the	client	receive	the	benefit	of	Medicare	funding	is	both	demeaning	and	
contrary	to	the	principles	of	evidence	based	practice.		It	also	has	the	effect	of	
impelling	the	practitioner	towards	unethical	modes	of	practice.		It	is	demeaning	
in	that	it	implies	that	the	practitioner	is	not	a	responsible	professional	who	is	
able	to	exercise	reasonable	judgment	when	choosing	an	intervention.		It	is	
contrary	to	the	principles	of	evidence‐base	practice	it	wrongly	equates	evidence	
based	practice	with	provision	of	empirically	supported	treatment.	
	
	
In	arguing	for	the	relevance	and	importance	of	professional	expertise	and	
professional	judgment,	I	am	not	suggesting	that	there	should	be	no	constrints	on	
providers	of	psychological	services.		There	will	always	be	practitioners	who	are	
unprofessional	in	one	or	other	respect	and	it	is	entirely	reasonable	to	introduce	
mechanisms	to	detect	and	sanction	unprofessional	conduct	when	it	occurs.		
However,	specification	of	treatment	is	a	very	weak	mechanism.		Practitioners	can	
and	do	advise	Medicare	they	are	providing	CBT	or	some	other	specified	therapy,	
even	if	this	is	not	the	case.		Specification	may	in	fact	encourage	this	form	of	
dishonesty.		There	are	already	in	place	professional	and	regulatory	mechanisms	
designed	to	control	unprofessional	conduct	of	registered	professionals.		If	the	
purpose	of	specification	of	treatment	is	to	constrain	unprofessional	conduct,	it	
would	be	much	more	effective	to	strengthen	these	regulatory	mechanisms	than	
to	specify	treatment.		In	any	case,	it	is	entirely	unsatisfactory	to	take	as	a	starting	
point	the	proposition	that	practitioners	will	not	conduct	therapy	in	the	best	
interests	of	clients	and	must	therefore	be	told	what	kind	of	therapy	to	provide.	
	
Specification	of	treatment	is	manifestly	incompatible	with	evidence‐based	
practice.		In	the	words	of	the	American	Psychological	Association	(endorsed	by	
the	APS	and	PACFA	in	Australia):		‘Evidence-based practice in psychology (EBPP) is 
the integration of the best available research with clinical expertise in the context of 
patient characteristics, culture, and preferences.’  The	best	available	research	at	the	
present	time	does	not	indicate	that	any	of	the	interventions	prescribed	by	
Medicare	are	superior	to	other	interventions	or	suitable	for	all	clients.		Equally	
importantly,	the	available	research	must	be	integrated	with	clinical	expertise	in	
the	context	of	client	culture,	characteristics	and	preferences.			Treatment	
specification	makes	no	allowance	for	any	of	these	critical	components	of	
evidence	based	practice.		In	other	words,	Medicare	is	in	effect	requiring	that	
practitioners	abandon	the	principles	of	evidence	based	practice	in	order	that	
their	clients	obtain	fee	relief. 
	
This	imposes	a	terrible	and	entirely	unnecessary	ethical	burden.		The	
practitioner	must	either	practice	in	accordance	with	EBP	principles	)and,	if	
necessary,	lie	about	it)	or	refuse	to	provide	services	under	Medicare,	thereby	
denying	access	to	those	without	financial	resources	to	pay	for	the	services	
themselves.			The	only	reason	this	is	not	a	source	of	outrage	within	the	
professional	community	is	because	a	generation	of	psychologists	has	been	
erroneously	taught	that	evidence‐based	practice	consists	of	implementing	so‐
called	empirically	supported	treatments,	which,	for	the	most	part,	means	CBT.		
	
From	a	policy	perspective	
	
There	are	many	reasons	why	treatment	prescription	under	Better	Access	is	bad	
policy.		To	start	with,	as	argued	above	it	is	contrary	to	the	interests	of	both	
clients	and	practitioners.		However,	there	are	other	important	and	adverse	policy	
implications	of	treatment	prescription.	
	
To	begin	with,	it	is	bad	policy	to	create	an	artificial	monopoly.		Prescription	of	
treatment	creates	a	limited	pool	of	providers.		Those	providers	are	then	well‐
placed	to	increase	service	costs.		In	the	case	of	services	under	Better	Access	this	
occurs	when	psychologists	or	other	providers	impose	‘gap	charges’	–	fees	over	
and	above	the	Medicare	rebate.		There	is	nothing	in	principle	wrong	with	a	
professional	charging	a	fee	that	is	higher	than	the	rebate.		Indeed,	this	is	common	
practice	for	medical	services.		However,	it	tends	to	defeat	the	central	policy	
objective,	which	is	to	maximize	public	access	to	effective	psychological	services.	
	
Second,	it	is	bad	policy	to	fund	services	but	have	no	capacity	for	quality	
assurance	of	these	services.		Better	Access	can	and	probably	do	call	pretty	much	
anything	they	choose	to	do	cognitive	behavior	therapy	(CBT).			However,	it	does	
not	follow	that	the	interventions	provided	bear	much	relation	to	the	treatment	
protocols	used	in	the	clinical	trials	that	provided	the	basis	for	specifying	the	
intervention	in	the	first	place.			This	problem	does	not	greatly	concern	me	simply	
because,	as	already	stated,	there	is	little	reason	to	believe	that	treatment	
specificity	or	for	that	matter	fidelity	play	a	major	role	in	outcome.		However,	it	
should	greatly	concern	those	who	manage	Better	Access	who	presumably	do	
believe	that	specifying	intervention	can	by	a	guarantee	of	quality.			
	
It	would	also	concern	the	public	if	they	knew	that	treatments	billed	as	CBT	had	
little	relation	to	the	manualised	interventions	used	in	the	studies	establishing	
their	effectiveness.		Since	treatment	prescription	is	the	primary	if	not	sole	form	
of	quality	assurance	in	Better	Access	and	it	fails	both	because	of	unenforceability	
and	ultimately	because	of	irrelevance,	it	follows	that	there	is	not	effective	quality	
assurance	despite	the	large	sums	of	public	money	invested	in	the	scheme.	
	
Third,	treatment	prescription	increasingly	duplicates	the	impressive	array	of	
online	self	help	CBT	that	the	Commonwealth	has	funded	over	the	past	10	years.		
Sites	such	as	On	Track	(https://www.ontrack.org.au/web/ontrack),	Anxiety	
Online	(http://www.anxietyonline.org.au)	and	eCouch	
(https://ecouch.anu.edu.au)	provide	well‐designed	modularized,	interactive	CBT	
self‐help.		There	are	no	fidelity	problems	(at	least	no	provider	violations),	the	
services	are	free	and	the	evidence	so	far	suggests	they	are	both	effective	and	
acceptable	to	users	(Andrews,	et	al,	2010).		While	many	people	will	want	or	need	
face‐to‐face	services,	there	is	little	merit	in	prescribing	the	same	face‐to‐face	
services	that	are	already	available	in	a	high	quality	online	environment.		Rather	
face‐to‐face	services	can	and	should	be	used	to	support	online	modules	and/or	
to	address	issues	or	needs	not	addressed	in	the	online	modules.		There	may	even	
be	an	argument	for	restricting	use	of	Better	Access	to	people	who	have	already	
completed	at	least	one	set	of	online	modules.		This	would	depend	on	adequate	
crisis	support	services.	
	
	
Is	there	a	better	alternative?	
Fortunately	there	are	better	ways	of	meeting	the	needs	of	clients	while	fulfilling	
key	policy	objectives.	The	solution	involves	some	elements	of	de‐regulation	and	
some	elements	of	increased	regulation.	
	
There	should	be	de‐regulation	both	of	interventions	supported	by	Medicare	and	
of	the	professions	able	to	provide	these	interventions.		For	reasons	set	out	above,	
there	is	no	basis	for	prescribing	interventions	and	good	reasons	not	to	prescribe	
them.		Equally	there	is	no	basis	for	restriction	of	providers,	which	is	contrary	to	
Australia’s	competition	policy	and	unnecessary	for	the	protection	of	the	public.		
There	is	no	evidence	that	psychological	interventions	are	more	effective	when	
provided	by	a	designated	professional	group	such	as	psychologists.		Rather	there	
is	clear	evidence	that	psychological	interventions	can	be	effectively	provide	by	a	
wide	range	of	health	professionals,	including	nurses,	and	by	appropriately	
trained	non‐professionals	(Montgomery	et	al,	2010).	
	
However,	opening	up	interventions	and	providers	should	not	occur	without	
some	appropriate	and	effective	quality	assurance	and	risk	management.		These	
can	best	be	accomplished	through	a	combination	of	routine	outcome	
measurement	and	regulation	of	providers	who	currently	operate	outside	of	any	
regulatory	environment.	
	
Routine	outcome	measurement	systems	are	well‐developed,	available	at	
reasonable	cost	and	their	use	may	even	enhance	treatment	outcomes	
(Shimokawan	et	al,	2010;	Bickman	et	al,	2011).		Essentially	they	work	by	means	
of	client	self	report	before	or	after	each	therapy	session.		These	are	submitted	
online	and	provide	a	record	of	response	to	treatment	that	can	be	made	available	
to	the	therapist,	the	client	and	to	third	party	funders	such	as	Medicare.		More	
importantly,	they	inform	clinical	decision‐making.		In	practice	this	means	that	all	
parties	(the	client,	the	practitioner	and	the	funder)	have	some	useful	information	
to	assist	key	decisions	such	as	when	to	end	treatment,	when	to	get	a	second	
opinion	and	when	to	fund	more	specialist	treatment	from	a	clinical	psychologist	
or	psychiatrist.	
	
The	Commonwealth	already	has	a	commitment	to	routine	outcome	
measurement	and	has	implemented	a	form	of	outcome	measurement	in	
publically	funded	mental	health	services.	In	my	view,	provision	of	Medicare	
funding	should	be	directly	linked	to	submission	of	session‐by‐session	online	
outcome	measures.		In	other	words,	payment	to	the	therapist	is	contingent	upon	
client	reports.		This	is	a	much	more	stringent,	transparent	and	effective	form	of	
quality	assurance	than	the	current	system.		It	requires	the	development	of	some	
IT	infrastructure	to	support	it	but	the	back‐end	is	already	developed	and	so	it	is	a	
matter	of	interface	rather	than	starting	from	scratch.	
	
It	is	essential	that	all	providers	of	Medicare	services	are	registered	and	subject	to	
a	regulatory	body	such	as	the	Australian	Health	Practitioner	Regulation	Agency	
(AHPRA).		This	is	to	ensure	that	practitioners	are	bound	by	a	set	of	ethical	
principles	and	a	code	of	conduct	and	members	of	the	public	have	recourse	when	
services	are	provided	unethically	or	in	a	manner	that	breaches	the	code.		This	is	
not	without	cost	but	the	cost	can	be	recovered	in	part	through	registration	fees.			
Existing	peak	bodies	such	as	the	Psychotherapy	and	Counselling	Federation	
(PACFA)	of	Australia	and	the	Australian	Counselling	Association	(ACA)	set	
membership	standards	that	provide	a	starting	point	for	qualification	of	service	
providers	but	a	body	like	AHPRA	is	much	better	suited	to	licensing	and	
regulation.	
	
These	changes	will	not	suit	everyone.		In	particular	the	profession	of	psychology,	
which	is	the	major	beneficiary	of	Better	Access,	may	be	concerned	that	its	pre‐
eminent	position	among	providers	will	be	threatened	or	that	the	income	of	
members	will	be	threatened.		In	my	view,	such	fears	are	probably	not	well‐
founded.		Psychologists	remain	well‐placed	to	provide	services	and	many	will	
welcome	the	increased	flexibility	of	service	provision	and	the	freedom	from	the	
ethical	dilemmas	that	attend	the	existing	scheme.		Competition	is	likely	to	lead	to	
innovation	and	greater	responsiveness	to	the	public,	which	ultimately	will	
enhance	rather	than	diminish	the	profession.		Historically,	trade	guilds	have	
resisted	change	and	de‐regulation	and	there	is	no	reason	to	expect	differently	in	
this	case.		However,	fear	of	the	response	of	a	trade	guild	is	not	an	adequate	
reason	to	avoid	reform.	
	
These	changes	are	not	a	panacea.		Cost	management	will	always	be	an	issue	in	
provision	of	services	that	have	only	weak	natural	limits.		Routine	outcome	
measurement	is	meaningful	and	adds	significant	value	but	it	is	just	one	indicator	
of	progress	and	should	inform	rather	than	dictate	clinical	decision‐making.		
Widening	the	range	of	therapies	and	therapists	will	inevitably	bring	into	play	a	
handful	of	crackpots	who	increase	the	workload	of	misconduct	tribunals	and	
even	garner	the	odd	headline.		However	these	are	manageable	problems	and,	in	
my	view,	the	benefits	of	reform	clearly	outweigh	the	limitations	and	problems.	
	
In	Conclusion	
Public	funding	of	the	provision	of	psychological	services	under	Medicare	meets	
important	public	needs	and	core	policy	objectives.		However,	the	current	scheme	
(Better	Access),	with	its	reliance	on	prescribed	therapy	and	a	very	restricted	set	
of	provders	is	critically	flawed	and	is	not	serving	consumers,	providers	or	policy	
objectives.		While	it	is	broken,	it	is	not	beyond	repair.			Reforms	that	eliminate	
reliance	of	prescribed,	brand	interventions	and	that	widen	providers	(while	at	
the	same	time	strengthening	the	regulatory	umbrella)	and	that	monitor	service	
quality	through	routine	outcome	measurement	will	make	it	a	more	consumer	
friendly,	effective	service.		It	is	even	possible	that	service	costs	will	be	better	
constrained.	
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